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Leadership – A Doctrine Lost and Found

A Monograph
by

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Since the end of World War II, the U.S. Army has attempted to adopt positive aspects of the World War II German Army's decentralized tactical leadership methodology currently called Auftragstaktik. This effort has been less than successful due to the long history of centralized tactical leadership in the U.S. Army. When the U.S. Army adopted AirLand Battle as its tactical and operational maneuver doctrine, it was concluded that decentralized leadership was necessary to successfully execute the maneuver required by that doctrine. The focus of this paper is to determine whether the U.S. Army can adopt decentralized leadership required by its maneuver oriented doctrine. Keywords:

The effort begins by documenting the leadership requirements necessary to support AirLand Battle, according to FM 100-5, Operations. Next, the U.S. Army focus on centralized leadership as its tactical command and control concept is examined in a historical context. (continued on other side of form)

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It is concluded that adoption of a decentralized tactical leadership doctrine to support the requirements of AirLand Battle is not only required but possible. However, in order to do so, significant changes must be made.

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

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

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

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ABSTRACT

LEADERSHIP - A DOCTRINE LOST AND FOUND by Major Terry M. Peck, USA, 47 pages.

Since the end of World War II, the U. S. Army has attempted to adopt positive aspects of the World War II German Army's decentralized tactical leadership methodology currently called Auftragstaktik. This effort has been less than successful due to the long history of centralized tactical leadership in the U.S. Army. When the U.S. Army adopted AirLand Battle as its tactical and operational maneuver doctrine, it was concluded that decentralized leadership was necessary to successfully execute the maneuver required by that doctrine. The focus of this paper is to determine whether the U.S. Army can adopt decentralized leadership required by its maneuver oriented doctrine.

The effort begins by documenting the leadership requirements necessary to support AirLand Battle, according to FM 100-5, Operations. Next, the U.S. Army focus on centralized leadership as its tactical command and control concept is examined in a historical context. A generally accepted example of decentralized leadership, Auftragstaktik, is examined with focus on only those aspects that directly affect the application of leadership concepts. The paper then compares the key aspects of centralized leadership and decentralized leadership derived from the concept of Auftragstaktik. A determination will be made about limitations which may hinder adoption of decentralized leadership concepts supportive of AirLand Battle requirements.

During the course of the study it was found that the primary reason the U.S. Army practices centralized leadership at the tactical level of command is that historically, during rapid mobilization, junior leader requirements exceeded the Army's capability to provide adequate numbers of trained, proficient officers. To compensate for inexperienced or marginally trained leadership at the tactical level, centralized control was necessary. It was determined that the large size of the "Cold War" active Army mitigates this historical problem to the point that it is no longer prohibitive to decentralized leadership. The study did find that a significant inhibitor to implementation was personnel turbulence which undermines unit cohesion.

It is concluded that adoption of a decentralized tactical leadership doctrine to support the requirements of AirLand Battle is not only required, but possible. However, in order to do so, significant changes must be made.

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Introduction

When the U.S. Army revised its "firepower-weighted" Active Defense to the initiative-oriented, maneuver and firepower balanced AirLand Battle, it signalled the reassertion of the human dimension of combat. The most significant aspect of this dimension is leadership. According to FM 100-5, Operations, AirLand Battle requires decentralized leadership to successfully achieve its tenets. The Army's mode of tactical leadership as evidenced by FM 22-100, Military Leadership, did not change significantly enough to support the new maneuver oriented doctrine. This occurred primarily because of strong institutional bias toward centralized command and control.(1)

AirLand Battle doctrine's requirement for decentralized command and control in contrast to the Army's historical focus on centralized command and control has left the Army seeking a clearly defined leadership concept. Such a concept must be acceptable based on current U.S. Army institutional standards as well as facilitate the execution of Army warfighting doctrine.

Auftragstaktik is a decentralized leadership doctrine which can be traced to the World War II German Army. The essence of this concept has been proposed as an alternative to the long standing centralized leadership practice of the

U.S. Army. Although it appears to be more complementary to the requirements of AirLand Battle than previous leadership practice, Auftragstaktik is a methodology of tactical leadership that is incongruous with American democracy based social and military heritage.(2)

Regardless of the style or concept selected, there is a critical need to align the U.S. Army's tactical leadership doctrine and practice with the current tactical maneuver doctrine. Specifically, decentralization is necessary to ensure proper execution of AirLand Battle tenets. Therefore, the question: Given a tendency toward centralization in the U.S. Army's tactical leadership philosophy, can a leadership doctrine based on decentralized leadership principles be adopted?

In addressing this question, I will look at the problem from the perspective of AirLand Battle doctrinal requirements which are outlined in FM 100-5. I will review the historical roots of the Army's tendency toward centralization in its current tactical leadership philosophy. I will address the maturation of Auftragstaktik in the German Army through World War II. Then I will conclude by comparing the two leadership concepts, and with recommendations for tactical leadership changes more supportive of AirLand Battle doctrinal needs.

When addressing doctrine, it is necessary to have a common understanding of the basic definition. Webster's dictionary provides the following acceptable,

understandable definition of doctrine: "Doctrine by definition is a theory based on carefully worked out principles and taught or advocated by its adherents."(3) Therefore, AirLand Battle doctrine, as well as all of its supporting doctrinal publications must be universally adhered to in order to be effectively executed.

AirLand Battle: The U.S. Army's Warfighting Doctrine

Since AirLand Battle became the official maneuver doctrine for the U. S. Army with the fielding of the 1982 edition of FM 100-5, Operations, the leadership philosophy of the Army has come under close scrutiny. Few would argue that the most essential component of an Army in combat is a soldier (to include leader) with character. It is also generally conceded that the next battlefield will be very unforgiving and will require initiative at every level. Specifically, leaders will be required who can give "mission-type" orders at all levels. Thus, decision-making decentralized to the lowest level will be required to execute AirLand Battle doctrine.(4)

FM 100-5 emphasizes flexibility and speed, mission type orders, initiative among commanders at all levels, and the spirit of the offense. Providing the basis for the leadership doctrine required to support the dynamic nature of AirLand Battle operations, FM 100-5 postulates the human aspect of winning on the battlefield as follows:

> Superior performance in combat depends on three essential components. First and foremost, it depends on superb soldiers and leaders with character and determination who will win because they simply will not accept losing. Next, it depends on a sound, well-understood doctrine for fighting. Finally, it depends on weapons and supporting equipment sufficient for the task at hand.(5)

Superb soldiers and sound, well-understood doctrine are directly dependent on good leadership. Determined, confident soldiers are derived from and are the core for cohesive, well trained units. Additionally, a sound, well understood leadership doctrine is a subset of a sound, well understood fighting doctrine. Cohesive units and sound leadership doctrine provide the determined fighting force led by confident leaders to execute AirLand Battle.

The leadership concepts the tactical leader must use to execute AirLand Battle are also specifically identified in FM 100-5.

> The command and control system which supports the execution of AirLand Battle doctrine must facilitate freedom to operate, delegation of authority, and leadership from any critical point on the battlefield.
>
> ...In the chaos of battle, it is essential to decentralize decision authority to the lowest practical level because overcentralization risks some loss of precision in execution.(6)

Decentralized Leadership requires a well-trained, confident officer who knows the capabilities of his unit. It also requires a leadership environment conducive to risk-taking.

> Decentralization demands subordinates who are willing and able to take risks and superiors who nurture that willingness and ability in their subordinates.(7)

The requirement for decentralized leadership as the doctrinal underpinning for tactical leader development within AirLand Battle is clear. Additionally, the requirements of unit cohesion and a clearly understood and followed leadership doctrine are two of the essentials which provide the environment for decentralized leadership. The apparent hesitancy by the U.S. Army to accept decentralized leadership doctrine lies in the historical retention of centralized leadership since the Revolutionary War. The following historical review of the evolution of U.S. Army leadership doctrine provides insight into why the Army has steadfastly maintained the practice of centralized leadership.(8)

Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Leadership Doctrine

Throughout the American Revolution decentralized command and control was commonplace. However, this was true for different reasons than may be desirable today. Most of the decentralization resulted because the majority of leaders and men were untrained, unregimented volunteers. With the exception of the Continental Army under General George Washington, most colonial forces were small bands of militia under the control of an emergent leader. These volunteers massed for short periods of time to engage a British force in brief engagements and then dispersed. Orders to these bands of men were usually in

writing and delivered by courier. These orders were general in nature, and tended toward a persuasive versus autocratic leadership style. Evidence that the concept of persuasive, "mission-type" directives was taken back to Germany by Hessian soldiers returning from the American Revolution has been documented. This decentralized leadership focus of mission-type orders used by American Revolutionary leaders was driven by the type of force led and not by doctrinal intentions.(9)

After the American Revolution, the Army struggled for its identity. Virtually every U.S. Army doctrinal concept was copied from the British or French manuals of the day. Popular distrust of large military forces and the perceived success of the colonial militia during the Revolution resulted in significant stagnation in American military thought. Furthermore, geographical isolation of the United States from conflicts between European countries, and the absence of neighboring countries who could threaten the existence of the new nation caused both the general populace and government to ignore military matters. Due to this indifference, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and its engineering graduates, essentially became the sole source of American military thought until the Civil War. However, works published about leadership were primarily translations and interpretations of European military theorists and supported centralized leadership as the accepted standard of the day.(10)

As a result of the centralized command procedures copied from the British and French tactical manuals of the period as well as the desire to appear professional in the eyes of their European counterparts, the U. S. Army adopted centralized command and control as the most effective doctrine to ensure an adequate fighting force. These centralized command concepts were subsequently reinforced during the period between the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, when the U.S. Army had to expand its forces rapidly on two occasions, the War of 1812 and the war with Mexico (1846-1848).(11)

In each of these conflicts, the requirement to fill the officer ranks with educated men who were untrained in military tactical operations demanded that centralized planning, detailed instructions, and centralized control of tactical operations by the few professional officers were paramount to successful execution. However, neither war was intense enough nor of adequate duration to develop an environment conducive to decentralized leadership. The Army failed to develop cohesive units or adequate numbers of experienced leaders at the tactical level.(12)

Unlike the war with Mexico, the American Civil War became an unintentional testbed for both centralized and decentralized leadership. In 1861, the already limited number of Regular Army officers available to lead tactical units was depleted even more when a significant number of experienced officers departed the U.S. Army for the

Confederacy as the southern states seceded. This, coupled with the induction of large numbers of untrained soldiers to meet the U. S. Army's needs, made it necessary for centralized command of forces in the field at all tactical levels.(13)

As the nation began the conflict in 1861, the reality was that the Union Army had a broad spectrum of experience in military leaders. The Regular Army officers who stayed in the Union Army when the southern states seceded essentially became the senior leadership. Injected into this cadre of regular officers were state or federally appointed officers with ranks from Lieutenant through General. Experience ranged from recent federal service, limited service during the Mexican War, to no previous military experience whatsoever. Ironically, this patchwork of leadership training and experience undermined, instead of reinforced, the centralized command and control concepts that had been commonplace for tactical operations.

This unique situation of having inexperienced leaders at every level of command, not just at the junior leader level, resulted in the personality of the leader and his "personal" style of leadership becoming the primary determinant of centralized/decentralized tactical leadership. The Army lacked a clearly understood and accepted leadership doctrine. Generally, the consequences were poorly executed tactical operations by the Union forces.

By the end of the American Civil War, the foundation of centralized leadership concepts had been significantly altered. The war's length had allowed for a culling process in the officer ranks leaving primarily competent, experienced officers at most levels. The duration of the conflict had additionally provided time for units to become cohesive combat organizations, since personnel were stabilized within their units. Centralized control by junior leaders over rank and file formations was the norm. However, decentralized command and control was commonplace above the regimental level. This decentralization was reinforced as improvements in weapons and tools from the Industrial Revolution resulted in an ever expanding battlefield, compromising centralized command and control throughout the Civil War.(14)

At the end of the Civil War, leadership training and practice sought divergent paths . The Army was reduced in size, occupied the southern states, and reoriented on its frontier mission. The United States Military Academy remained the center of doctrinal thought. The Academy's focus was historical in nature and continued to be European and centralized in orientation. This European focus was sustained even when reviewing American Civil War operations, addressing those operations from the perspective of correct application of European military theory. As a part of that European military thought, centralized command and control of tactical units continued

to dominate written tactical leadership concepts. However, officers leaving the "school" environment to perform duty on the frontier found an entirely different style of leadership characterized by decentralization.(15)

Regimental commanders given responsibility for large areas of the country which they were to secure for settlement, found it necessary to disperse their troops to posts throughout their area. Post commanders found that constabulary duties generally required a decentralized style in order to comply with the mission of regional security. Although each post had to submit routine reports of operations performed in their area of responsibility, the absence of the telegraph at most frontier posts resulted in little direct involvement by higher headquarters in the execution of daily operations. Only when regimental and larger organizations had to be formed to deal with Indian disturbances was centralized command and control used.(16)

The Army failed to focus on its actual leadership needs in the isolated frontier post operations, as its educational emphasis was on large unit operations, European wars, and centralized leadership. The absence of appropriate leadership training for officers destined for frontier service generated situational application of informal decentralized leadership, resulting in inconsistent leadership application and poor Army performance in general. This gulf between centralized,

large unit leadership training and the requirement to exercise decentralized small unit command and control remained a characteristic of the U.S. Army following the Spanish-American War, up to our declaration of war with Germany in 1917.(17) The result was a void in practical tactical leader training and development which affected not only leadership style, but also unit structure during the First World War.(18)

As General Pershing put together the American Expeditionary Force in 1917 for movement to Europe, leadership education remained centralized and heavily influenced by European doctrine involving large formations.(19) The rapid and massive mobilization required to meet the Army's need for personnel generally dictated the need for centralized command and control because of a lack of adequate numbers of trained military leaders. General Pershing's concern over the lack of adequate leadership resources forced him to retain large divisional organizations, controlled with detailed orders at all levels. General George Marshall, while Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School after World War I, stated that he had been involved in the preparation of over-elaborate planning and the proliferation of written, "highly paragraphed" orders, which reflected the American Army's anxiety to show itself professional under the scrutiny of its Allies.(20)

General Marshall believed that American success in

battle had been achieved by the courage of the individual leader and soldier and not by the "soundness" of centralized leadership doctrine. He felt that fortunately, due to the exhausted state of the German Army, they could not take advantage of the American leadership mistakes which resulted from poor training. The relatively short duration of the U.S. Army's involvement in World War I prevented the development of the level of cohesion and leader experience necessary to exercise decentralized leadership similar to that seen in the American Civil War. The need for a decentralized tactical leadership style did not go unnoticed however, and was reflected in several post-World War I military publications.(21)

In an effort to correct the deficiency, General Marshall attempted to instill initiative and junior leader freedom of action into the leadership concepts of the Army with significant changes in the Army's written doctrine. This effort is illustrated in the 1941 U.S. Army Field Service Regulations, which incorporated the following ideas from the 1936 German manual, Truppenfuhrung("Command of Troops"):

> In spite of the advances in technology, the worth of the individual man is still decisive. Every individual must be trained to exploit a situation with energy and boldness and must be imbued with the idea that success will depend upon his initiative and action.
> ...A willingness to accept responsibility is the foremost trait of leadership. Every individual from the highest commander to the lowest private must always remember that inaction and neglect of opportunities will warrant more severe censure than an error in judgement in the action taken.(22)

These statements, which clearly focus on individual initiative and decentralized execution, changed for the first time the written doctrinal leadership position of the Army. General Marshall felt that success on the post-World War I battlefield would require decentralized leadership.(23)

During World War II, these new concepts were overwhelmed by the realities of a U.S. Army that expanded from 267,767 men to over 8 million. The officer corps expanded from 18,326 to 891,663 during that same four year period, with only 14,775 officers coming from a partially trained National Guard. Initially, junior leader initiative gave way to a mechanical system of - receive order, execute order, wait for next order - as young, inexperienced and quickly but poorly trained soldiers and officers began to fill the ranks of tactical units as individual replacements. Exceptions to centralized control of tactical units in the U.S. Army were unusual throughout this period of the war and were documented only at division and higher levels.(24)

The leadership style of the U.S. Army in World War II was generally centralized. When hostilities terminated, the U.S. Army had the potential in terms of trained and experienced leaders and cohesive units to escape the environmental constraints that had tied it to centralized command and control. The Wehrmacht's impressive tactical

performance during the war had drawn U.S. Army interest to how the Germans trained and commanded their soldiers and leaders. As noted earlier General Marshall incorporated several ideas from the German "command" manuals into Army publications prior to World War II. However, after 1945, the Army even more actively solicited leadership comments and recommendations from captured German commanders. Additionally, the Army attempted to incorporate concepts from the German manual, Truppenfuhrung, into many Army field manuals. In an attempt to label the German leadership methodology with a common term of reference for the concepts, Auftragstaktik was coined by German officers to refer to the holistic philosophy that many felt had produced the Wehrmacht's "fighting power".(25)

Since World War II, the Army has attempted to incorporate various aspects of Auftragstaktik into its leadership concept. In order to see how and why many leadership techniques derived from this methodology may be desirable for the U.S. Army in executing AirLand Battle requirements, it is necessary to review the historical development of Auftragstaktik.

Historical Development of Auftragstaktik

Auftragstaktik is essentially a term of convenience, created after World War II by German officers to identify the all-encompassing German approach to war. Significantly, the Bundeswehr uses the term today to describe their own concept of command and control using "mission-type tactics". This usage, however, is a significantly narrower perspective than that used by the Wehrmacht generals in their attempt to identify their warfighting leadership philosophy during World War II.(26)

Although the German leadership generally claims that the concept of "mission-type" orders was brought back from the American Revolution by Hessian mercenaries, there is little evidence of its impact on Prussian or German military writings or leadership processes in the 18th Century. However, after the 1806 defeat by Napoleon, the Prussians made their first military reforms dealing with leadership under the guidance of General von Scharnhorst.

Among these reforms was the creation of the "Krumpersystem" of regular army forces reinforced by an equally trained reserve. This made available a large number of trained forces for mobilization. Additionally, for the first time a commoner could become an officer. Later in the 1860's, von Moltke(the elder) leading the German general staff as well as the Kriegsakademie, began to seriously review the need for reforms in leadership

based on advances in technology and in sizes of armies.(27)

Von Moltke(the elder) fostered an environment in the general staff in which a dialectic on the nature of war could continuously exist. It focused on such issues as desirable leadership attributes - primarily character, tactical command and control, leader - subordinate interaction, and the training/education requirements of soldiers. For him, lessons learned from Prussian command and control problems during the Austro-Prussian War in 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) highlighted the need for initiative and aggressiveness at all levels of tactical command. Von Moltke's personal difficulties with moving large tactical formations against the French were mirrored at every tactical level of command including that of battalions and companies. Von Moltke's observations as well as post-war writings by von Schlichting and other officers who had commanded field units during the above mentioned wars were instrumental in changes made to the Drill Regulations of the Infantry in 1888. They paid particular attention to decentralized command and control.(28)

The Drill Regulations of the Infantry emphasized that commanders should say what they wanted their subordinates to do in general terms and leave the freedom of action for the subordinate to determine how he would execute the mission. Although von Moltke(the elder) had essentially done this with his immediate subordinates from 1866 on, now

this philosophy of decentralized leadership was implemented throughout the tactical leadership structure in an attempt to enhance tactical flexibility. This decentralized leadership concept was based on von Moltke's vision of the future battlefield. His vision included widely dispersed units operating independently over large areas while executing mission-type orders in concert. This 1866 vision is amazingly similar to current U.S. Army AirLand Battle doctrine of synchronized battles (deep, close, and rear).(29)

Changes occurred in German leadership philosophy when Count von Schlieffen followed von Moltke as Chief of the German general staff (1891-1906). Von Schlieffen was a man of strict schedules who suppressed decentralized leadership in favor of more controlled execution. The famous "Schlieffen Plan" was based on a precise timetable for execution. As a result, in World War I there was mixed application of decentralized leadership by the German Army.(30)

Von Moltke(the younger) who followed von Schlieffen as chief of the general staff, understood the importance of decentralized leadership in ensuring that tactical opportunities weren't lost. However, he determined that decentralized leadership did not allow for the precision required to execute the "Schlieffen Plan". Thus, decentralization as a leadership concept saw limited use during the initial days of the war.

With the resulting loss of freedom of action for his subordinate leaders, von Moltke(the younger) in his attempt to execute the "Schlieffen" plan, found himself faced with the problem of how to effectively command and control widely dispersed units as had his uncle 40 years earlier. The loss of tactical initiative became evident early as the German invasion stagnated and tactics began to conform to the dictates of what came to be termed "trench" warfare. Decentralized command and control was forgotten as tactical commander's initiative suffocated under detailed written orders and direct wire, verbal communications virtually from the Kaiser direct to battalion.(31)

In an attempt to change the terms of battle to their advantage and break out of trench warfare, the German Army developed a number of innovative tactical techniques including the "Elastic" defense in 1916 and assault "Hutier" tactics in 1918. Significantly, both of these concepts centered around freedom of action for the tactical commander and junior leader initiative necessary to take advantage of situational opportunities. It is interesting to note that where the Allies turned to technology in the tank to attempt to break the stalemate on the Western Front, the Germans focused on the human factor and emphasized leadership as the key to success.(32)

Although the new tactics the Germans instituted during World War I did not prove decisive enough to bring victory, the success they enjoyed as a result of reapplication of

decentralized leadership techniques was not lost on the large numbers of junior officers who were to see service in World War II as generals and field marshals. The importance of the human factor in war and decentralized leadership was to become the central theme of the German Army doctrinal leadership manual, Truppenfuhrung. This manual provided the leadership framework during the inter-war years and World War II.(33)

During the inter-war period, primarily from 1933-1939, Auftragstaktik reached maturity as a holistic concept. It guided the actions of both soldiers and leaders in the military sub-culture of what would ultimately be the Third Reich. Prior to 1933, the adoption of "mission-type" tactics and training of independent, free thinking leaders was the norm with Auftragstaktik as the undercurrent. During the inter-war period, tremendous leadership turbulence and infighting within the German general staff resulted in a complete review of political-military relationships as well as requirements necessary for execution of war from the strategic through the tactical level. Out of this internal reevaluation by the German Army in 1933, came a new general staff, highly supportive of the concept of decentralized leadership. Ludwig Beck was its Chief. Thus, Germany's concept for building an army centered on leadership as the decisive factor. It focused on the fighting soldier as the decisive element and began to shape a military environment to tie soldier and

leader together into what many historians have claimed was the most cohesive fighting force documented in modern history.(34)

A highly cohesive and effective fighting force was critical to Germany as a nation surrounded by hostile or potentially hostile enemies. The nation's very existence depended on the ability of the Army to defeat any invading force. Encouraged to excel in their profession of arms, unlike the military of a country secure through geographical isolation like the United States, the focus of the German military in 1933 was constantly on improvement. The strong support of the population encouraged high quality volunteers to fill the ranks and strengthened individual identification with the military profession even before enlistment. Building on this national support in 1933, the German Army developed an increased identification with the soldier. It reinforced his individual importance from the perspective of how he added to the integrity of the organization.(35)

To clearly present the military environment in its all encompassing perspective to the soldiers and their leaders, the Army needed a finely distilled document which rigorously laid out the requirements for the members of the service from the recruit to the field marshal. Truppenfuhrung, published in 1936, supplied that guidance. The importance of the individual as the essence of unit cohesion is clear:

> War is an art, a free creative activity ... It makes the highest demands on a man's entire personality. ...The advance of technology notwithstanding, the role of the individual remains decisive. ...The emptiness of the battlefield demands independently thinking and acting fighters who exploit each situation in a considered, determined and bold way. ...The quality of commander and men determines the fighting power (kampfkraft) of a unit ...High fighting power can cancel out numerical inferiority. The higher this quality, the stronger and the more mobile the conduct of war. Superior leadership and superior troops are secure bases for victory.(36)

This commitment to the human factor of warfare and specifically to individual independence of action and decisiveness shows clearly the framework for the German Army's decentralized leadership concept.

The importance of these same concepts to the American military leadership philosophy in 1940 is illustrated by the fact that the same words are used, often verbatim in the 1941, FM 100-5. Also, as we will note later, the ideas will be paraphrased in the 1986 FM 100-5 and 1983 FM 22-100, Military Leadership.

With the 1936 Truppenfuhrung as its primary doctrinal manual, the Wehrmacht reinforced a military structure that was conducive to the use of decentralized leadership. Essential elements of that structure which strengthened decentralized leadership were individual commitment, cohesive units, and a nurturing leadership environment.(37)

The German Army felt that leadership performance was tied directly to individual soldier commitment to the Army. Commitment to ideals such as freedom, democracy, or National Socialism were felt to be too perishable.

Commitment to the organization to which the individual belonged was controllable by that organization. Therefore, it became the focus of the Wehrmacht's military integration of the individual recruit. To achieve this commitment from the soldier, the German Army centered the soldier's allegiance on the professional ideals of the military. This was achievable primarily as a result of a civilian population tolerant of a separate, unrestricted military society with its own demands on commitment from the individual, separate from the civilian social norms. The expectations from the soldier, as well as what he could expect from his leadership and the organization were encapsulated in Truppenfuhrung. The demands placed on the soldier were rigorous and intended to strengthen his commitment to the organization through stressful indoctrination into a military life style. The essence of this commitment is captured in Fighting Power:

> The German Army at all times regarded itself as a fighting organization above all, and the treatment meted out to its personnel was designed solely in order to raise their combat effectiveness to the highest possible peak. In a German officer's instructions, the need to look after his men invariably figured well behind the imperative of maintaining fighting power, and as a function thereof.
>
> ... Precisely because its power was the product of organization and not of any ideals, the German Army was capable both of fighting with the utmost heroism and of cold-bloodedly butchering untold numbers of innocent people. So perfect was its organization, so excellent its methods, that its personnel simply did not care whom they fought and why. They were soldiers and did their duty.(38)

This commitment to the Army instead of national ideals, incongruous with American societal standards, simplified

the German leader's task of establishing unit cohesion.

To strengthen unit cohesion and reinforce decentralized leadership, the German Army used several key unit structuring and administrative techniques. First, combat divisions were filled with personnel along ethnic lines (ie. Prussians, Saxon, etc.). These divisions received replacements from habitually supporting training regiments in the rear. The training regiments were staffed by noncommissioned and commissioned officers from the combat division supported, and provided to the division trained units of battalion-size versus individual replacement. This emphasized cohesion from the time the battalion started training and affiliation with the combat division long before assignment to the front. These units went forward as battalions ready for combat. The impact at the front was that combat units would many times fight at forty to sixty percent strength for extended periods before having to be pulled out of the line. The negative impact of fighting at this reduced strength was marginal due to the compensating effect that unit cohesion had on "fighting power".(39)

Secondly, decentralized administration of personnel to the regimental level enhanced the soldier's identification with the unit. Officer and noncommissioned officer selection, awards, punishments and soldier reassignments, all were controlled by the regimental commander. This one person which the soldier knew, determined his day to day

existence in the army. Because the soldier's world was within the regiment and he usually stayed in the same regiment throughout the war, his commitment to the organization was significant.(40)

Finally, noncommissioned and commissioned officer selection, the preponderance of their training, and their subsequent assignments were all decentralized to the regimental level. Historically, noncommissioned officers were selected from the ranks after a year's service with the regiment. Then, for two years they were trained in a special battalion within the regiment, constantly under the scrutiny of the senior NCOs and officers with whom they would ultimately work. Fraternization between these future NCOs and the current leaders in the regiment was encouraged. This, plus their comparatively high status in surrounding society and demanding leadership training, created a class of tough professionals which was the core of the Wehrmacht until the end of World War II.

In 1936, a Central Army School for Noncommissioned Officers was established. Run by senior NCOs and officers with combat experience, and based on the concept that every man should know how to perform the duties of his superior two ranks higher, it provided the NCOs necessary to meet the expanding army's requirement without compromising quality. "...Whereas the intelligent, thinking NCO had been an exception in 1914, he became the rule twenty-five years later."(41)

As with the noncommissioned selection process, the regimental commander initiated recommendations for individuals to be officer candidates. These recommendations were initiated after several personal interviews to ensure proper background, education, intelligence and above all, character. "In sifting applicants, regimental commanders looked for willpower and a sense of responsibility above all -- in short, it was 'character' that counted."(42) Even after completion of training and a psychological evaluation, an officer candidate had to return to the regimental commander for a final decision on whether he should be commissioned. This decentralized system developed officers, who even as candidates, began an indispensable association with the unit and whom the unit leadership observed virtually throughout their training as leaders.(43)

The above mentioned personnel management policies supporting unit cohesion were essential for the execution of decentralized leadership in the Wehrmacht. Those policies provided units that had both personal and professional cohesion and were internally stable throughout their commitment to combat. They had regimental level leader selection and training which ensured high quality leadership. These factors, along with others equally important but less related to leadership, comprised the integrated parts of what the German officers called Auftragstaktik after World War II.

These policies specifically instituted by the Wehrmacht to generate unit cohesion and a command atmosphere supportive of decentralized leadership were validated by a post-World War II U.S. Army review. Thus, the dilemma for U.S. Army adoption of German decentralized methods or retention of World War II U.S. Army wartime personnel policies evolved.(44)

The centralized personnel policies used by the U.S. Army during World War II generated units by combining individuals from across the United States. These policies also filled gaps created by casualties or rotation with individual replacements. This usually occurred with little or no indoctrination prior to commitment to combat. Noncommissioned and commissioned officers were selected based on education or aptitude evaluation, without any determination of leadership capability or quality of character. The results of these policies proved to be poor unit cohesion, excessively high casualty rates for newly acquired personnel in combat units, as well as tactical leaders who were perceived to be more concerned about their own needs than the welfare of their soldiers.(45)

As a result of these adverse perceptions of U.S. Army policies and the assumption that the Wehrmacht was effective because of its use of Auftragstaktik, the U.S. Army has attempted to integrate many of the Wehrmacht's tactical leadership concepts into its military doctrine. The initial result of this effort was the tactical

leadership manual, which is now designated FM 22-100. It was changed to specifically emphasize decentralized leadership following World War II.(46)

However, in spite of the emphasis on decentralized leadership in the Army's tactical leadership manuals since World War II, centralized leadership continues to be the predominate tactical leadership concept in use. This continued dependence on centralized tactical leadership techniques appears to be the result of the U.S. Army's inability to create the necessary leadership environment for decentralized leadership. That environment was created in the Wehrmacht primarily through unit cohesion from personnel stabilization and a leadership doctrine which nurtured responsible risk-taking and decisive, independent actions from tactical leaders at all levels. Through a comparison of the U.S. and German Armies' leadership concepts, the hesitancy for U.S. Army implementation of decentralized leadership should be illuminated.(47)

Comparison of U. S. and German Leadership Doctrines

Leadership concepts are generally derived in direct relation to the needs of the organization. It has been shown that for the U.S. Army, centralized leadership concepts have been the dominate leadership style for all large conflicts after the Revolutionary War. The U.S. Army initially adopted a European based tactical doctrine which

included centralized leadership to fill a doctrinal void. It was also determined necessary to establish military credibility with foreign powers. Ultimately however, centralized leadership was retained because the U.S. Army maintained a small regular force in peacetime, but was required to rapidly expand during conflict. This rapid expansion prevented the needed unit cohesion and leader training necessary for effective decentralized leadership to be practiced. Even though the U.S. Army perceived the advantages of decentralized leadership practice on the modern battlefield, as evidenced in General Marshall's writings as well as those of others, institutional barriers restricting the size of a peacetime regular force versus wartime leadership requirements prevented its adoption and practice.

For the German Army from 1932 through 1945, decentralized leadership concepts dominated both perceived and actual needs. Because the Army was essential to the survival of the German state throughout its history, its tactical leadership concepts were generated principally as a result of the requirement to command troops in the most effective manner. Both leadership and the tactical maneuver doctrine were designed to maximize flexibility in dealing with the uncertainty of war. This focus on tactical requirements without external political interference allowed for a continuity of leadership philosophy, subject to constant improvement, since

decentralized leadership was first officially encouraged by von Moltke(the elder) in 1866. Auftragstaktik was the attempt to integrate every aspect of military power by focusing for synergistic effect the strength of the combat forces through leadership concepts.(48)

In comparison to the above mentioned historically documented leadership doctrines, the U.S. Army leadership doctrinal requirements for AirLand Battle as outlined in FM 100-5 are focused on decentralized command and control, mission type orders, tolerant command environment that encourages responsible risk taking, and strong unit cohesion and commitment from the soldier. The historical barriers to successful implementation appear to be mobilization requirements, and the resultant lack of trained leadership and unit cohesion. In an attempt to find a solution to circumvent these barriers while satisfying AirLand Battle needs, a comparison of basic U.S. Army and German Army mobilization during World War II is useful. This is particularly significant from the perspective of attempting to solve unit cohesion and leadership environment problems.(49)

The primary constraint to the wholesale adoption of a decentralized leadership concept in the U. S. Army has been the lack of capability to provide enough trained leadership to the tactical units when the Army mobilizes for combat. Historically this has been a case of overwhelming numbers of essentially untrained personnel being rapidly absorbed

into an extremely small regular Army. For example, during World War I the Army expanded from approximately 200,000 men to 1,500,000 men within nine months of the U.S. declaration of war. In World War II, the Army expanded from 267,767 men to 1,460,998 men during 1941 and grew to 8,266,373 men by 1945. These mobilizations effectively eliminated any possibility of decentralized command and control at the tactical level because of inadequate training time for newly inducted leaders, both officer and NCO.(50)

In comparison, the German Army expanded from 98,700 men in 1933 to 3,000,000 in 1939 and peaked at 8,250,000 in 1943. They were able to maintain enough trained leadership to meet their tactical unit needs because of their emphasis on building cadres of noncommissioned and commissioned officers during the 1933 to 1939 rearmament period. The plan obviously was for the Army to be filled out by more rapid expansion in 1939 when the German Army actually mobilized. Key to this concept of mobilization was the stabilization of leaders and soldiers in a unit and more importantly, a common leadership concept practiced throughout the Army to generate the cohesion and trust necessary for decentralized execution.(51)

It is unlikely that in any future conflict the U. S. Army would experience a period comparable to Germany's rearmament in which to generate leaders. However, a solution may be found in our current force structure with

the Active, Reserve, and National Guard components.

The "Total Army" Active and Reserve force totals 1,545,200 men. Using this figure as a start point or potential "cadre" and using the mobilization percentage figure of 6 percent of the population as was the case in 1941, the U.S. Army should be able to absorb conservatively 2,000,000 soldiers the first year without compromising tactical leadership competence. This is supported by the Wehrmacht's expansion figures since they were able to successfully execute mobilization and retain a decentralized leadership doctrine.(52)

The expectation that the United States would ever be in a future war that could last long enough to require total induction of the civilian potential into the armed services is not considered by most authorities to be great. However, the ability to successfully execute significant portions of that task while retaining a decentralized leadership doctrine does appear achievable.

The two subordinate, but essential requirements for decentralized leadership according to both FM 100-5 and the German Truppenfuhrung are cohesive units and a leadership environment that nurtures junior leader initiative and responsible risk-taking. In the past, the U.S. Army has been unsuccessful in achieving both prerequisites for decentralized leadership.(53)

Although unit cohesion is stated as one of the essential requirements for the successful execution of

AirLand Battle, the U. S. Army's policy of regular personnel rotation essentially prevents units from achieving true cohesion. Specifically, unit cohesion is derived from essentially integrated relationships. Most important of these is soldier identification with and commitment to his unit. The soldier must also trust in and have a commitment to his leadership and feel his leader's trust and confidence in him. Each of these relationships is different, but they all depend upon allowing time for interaction necessary to generate cohesion.(54)

The German Army's policy of stabilizing soldiers in their units throughout the war appeared to be key to extremely strong unit cohesion. The Union and Confederate Armies in the American Civil War operated with soldiers stabilized in their regiments throughout the conflict. This led to strong unit identification and concurrently, strong unit cohesion. Such unit cohesion was essentially nonexistent in the U.S. Army units in World War II. This was in large part because they were continuously receiving individual replacements. The U.S. Army additionally had no policy for stabilizing soldiers in their units. Current U.S. Army personnel rotation policies are similar to those of World War II and are not supportive of unit cohesion. Although the U.S. Army has recently demonstrated sensitivity to the problem and instituted initiatives such as homebasing, COHORT training and assignment, and regimental affiliation; a specific policy has not been

instituted designed to minimize unit turbulence.(55)

A clear and universally supported leadership concept is another essential aspect to implementing decentralized leadership. Following World War II, the U.S. Army conducted a vast number of investigations into how it functioned and why. The various attributes and shortcomings were analyzed in detail. An important outcome of these investigations was the realization that Army leadership doctrine had suppressed tactical leader initiative. This resulted in significant loss of what the German Army believed to be decisive in the conduct of war; mutual trust, a willingness to assume responsibility, and the right and duty of subordinate commanders at all levels to make independent decisions and carry them out.(56)

By 1936, the Wehrmacht had established a simple, universally understood and adhered to tactical leadership doctrine. Initiative was encouraged at all levels and steps were taken to ensure that the junior leader understood that he must take responsible risks as opportunities were presented. Importantly, the German Army apparently was willing to accept the results of isolated tactical leader failure in order to reap the benefits resulting from overall tactical leader success. Having learned the synergistic effect of opportunities exploited at each level during its major conflicts since 1866, the German Army retains decentralized leadership in the concept of Auftragstaktik today.

FM 22-100, Military Leadership, provides historical examples of U.S. Army leaders who took "risks" and were successful because they exploited opportunities in combat. These appear to be exceptions to the U.S. Army leadership practice of the day. However, because they were unique and successful, they are held up as examples to be emulated in the execution of AirLand Battle. It must be understood that they are examples of individual risk-taking, not doctrinally supported risk-taking by officers trained to perform in that manner. Because these examples are in the official leadership manual, it suggests that the Army has adopted decentralized leadership. However, the U.S. Army has not been able to achieve institutional implementation because the leadership manual has diffused the need to change by retention of centralized leadership concepts. Thus, it appears that the U.S. Army is in a critical leadership transition.(57)

FM 100-5 has attempted to reorient the Army's leadership thrust by stating that to execute AirLand Battle we must have decentralized command and control, mission type orders, and an environment stressing initiative among commanders at all levels. It is clear that the U.S. Army must now complete the alignment of its leadership manual with AirLand Battle doctrine in order for its junior leaders to concentrate on the key doctrinal requirements as outlined in FM 100-5. The U.S. Army must implement a single decentralized approach to leadership.(58)

CONCLUSIONS

The intent of this study was to determine if AirLand Battle doctrine is supported by current U. S. Army leadership doctrine. If not, why not; and what is needed to correctly aline the two if they are not harmonious. The results indicate that the current Army leadership doctrinal requirements for decentralized leadership have not been implemented. Therefore, current U.S. Army leadership concepts do not fully support AirLand Battle doctrine, the success of which is dependent on decentralized operations.

This difference exists not because the desire and intent are lacking, but because of restrictions imposed as a result of civilian attitudes toward the military establishment in peacetime. Historically U.S. Army leadership doctrine was primarily driven outside-in; that is, outside political influences created a requirement for a small standing force capable of expansion in times of national emergency. The resulting lack of capability to provide sufficient numbers of trained, experienced leaders to tactical units dictated centralized leadership even when it was not necessarily the most tactically desirable. Although mobilization is still required to meet requirements for a worldwide conflict, the size of the current "Total" peacetime force mitigates the negative impact of mobilization. Available Active, Reserve, and National Guard leadership pools support the concept of

decentralized leadership. Therefore, it could be implemented now as the official U.S. Army leadership doctrine, regardless of level of conflict.

Before the Army can implement a concept of decentralized leadership characterized by mission-oriented orders, junior leader independence of action, initiative, and responsible risk taking, it must improve unit cohesion. Additionally it must make changes to the existing leadership environment as follows:

a. The U.S. Army tactical leadership manual, FM 22-100, must be rewritten to require implementation of the leadership concepts essential to the Army's warfighting doctrine outlined in FM 100-5.

b. A simple, easily understood and consistent decentralized leadership doctrine must be universally accepted and followed throughout the Army at the tactical unit level. This doctrine must be a conceptual starting point from which a leader can exercise initiative in support of his commander's intent without violating the basic concepts. He must be free to generate an environment which will encourage junior leader independence of action, responsible aggressiveness and initiative, and freedom to attempt and fail, essential to the success of AirLand Battle.

c. A more stabilized personnel environment will have to be established in tactical units to provide the catalyst for generating strong unit cohesion. Recent Army

initiatives have moved toward this goal, but personnel turbulence continues to be a significant stumbling block.(59)

Thus, the Army can come full circle. In the Revolutionary War, a type of decentralized leadership was used because it best served the Army as well as the soldier's needs. The U.S. Army is again finding it necessary and desirable to implement decentralized leadership because it best supports the requirements of its warfighting doctrine. Therefore, it is not only possible to change from centralized to decentralized leadership, it is necessary to provide the confident, responsible combat leader who can win on the diverse battlefields of the future. Not to do so probably will result in costly battlefield experimentation and can result in the ultimate failure of the U.S. Army's warfighting doctrine.

ENDNOTES

1. John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle, Fort Monroe, Va., June 1984, Forward, p.iii.

2. Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945. Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1982, p. 190.

3. Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, College Edition, World Publishing Co., 1964.

4. U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1986. p. 15.

5. Ibid, P. 5.

6. Ibid, P. 15, 21

7. Ibid, P. 15

8. Creveld, Fighting Power, pp. 193-194.

9. Oberstleutnant Walter von Lassow, Army of the Federal Republic of Germany, "Mission-Type Tactics Versus Order-Type Tactics", Military Review, 57 (June 1977): 87-91. See also Russell F. Weigley, "American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War", Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 410. See also John Shy, "First Battles in Retrospect", America's First Battles, Lawrence, Ks, University Press of Kansas, 1986, p. 331.

10. Weigley, Makers of Modern Strategy, p. 412. See also Russell F. Weigley, "A Historian Looks at the Army", Military Review, 52, Feb. 72, p. 26. Also see S. P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Camgridge, Mass., 1957, p. 155.

11. Weigley, Makers of Modern Strategy, p. 410. See also Shy, America's First Battles, p. 332.

12. Weigley, Makers of Modern Strategy, p. 414.

13. James A. Huston, Sinews of War, Washington D.C., 1966, p.175. In 1861, the U.S. Army totaled approximately 16,000 men, primarily stationed in garrison duty on the frontier. By 1865, the U.S. Army totaled over 1,000,000 men throughout the theater of war.

14. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War, Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1973, pp. 92-128.

15. Weigley, Makers of Modern Strategy, p. 437.

16. Weigley, The American Way of War, pp. 153-163.

17. Ibid., pp. 159-163.

18. Shy, America's First Battles, p. 330.

19. Weigley, The American Way of War, p.196.

20. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880-1939, New York, New York, Viking Press, 1963, p. 250

21. Ibid., p. 254

22. U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, U.S. Army Field Service Regulations, 1941, p. 100.

23. Pogue, George C. Marshall, p. 254.

24. R. Elberton Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, The War Department, 1970, p. 122, table 16. See also Creveld, Fighting Power, pp. 2, 89-90.

25. Creveld, Fighting Power, p. 1. A term used by Martin van Creveld in his book of the same name, dated December 1980. In that publication, Creveld defines fighting power as the "sum total of mental qualities that make armies fight". This includes discipline, cohesion, morale, initiative, courage, toughness, the willingness to fight and the readiness to die.

26. Lossow, "Mission-Type Tactics Versus Order-Type Tactics", pp. 87-91.

27. David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, MacMillan Publishing Company, New York, New York, 1966, p. 872.

28. Sigismund Schlichting, "Infantry Battle", p. 67.

29. Hajo Holborn, "The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff", Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 288-289.

30. Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August, New York, New York, MacMillan Publishing Company, 1962, pp. 23-27.

31. Martin van Creveld, Command in War, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 168-171.

32. Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945", Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 540-541.

33. Creveld, Fighting Power, p. 30.

34. C. Barnett, "The Education of Military Elites", Journal of Contemporary History, ii, 1967, P. 26.

35. Geyer, Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 554-558.

36. Heeres Dienstvorschrift 300, Berlin, 1936. This remained in effect through World War II. The following is a portion of the introduction which supports the subject addressed.

Introduction

1. War is an art, a free creative activity resting on scientific foundations. It makes the highest demands on a man's entire personality.

2. The art of war is in a state of constant development. New weapons cause it to assume ever-changing forms. The advent of these weapons must be foreseen in good time, and their effect correctly assessed. Thereupon they must be quickly taken into service.

3. The situations arising out of war are infinitely varied. They change often and unexpectedly and can rarely be foreseen in advance. Often it is precisely those factors that cannot be measured that are of the greatest importance. One's own will is confronted by the enemy's independent one. Friction and errors are everyday occurrences.

4. It is impossible to exhaustively lay down the art of war in regulations. The latter merely serve as guiding lines that must be applied in accordance with circumstances. Simplicity and consistency in action present the best way of obtaining results.

10. The advance of technology notwithstanding, the role of the individual remains decisive. His significance has been further enhanced by the dispersion characteristic of modern warfare. The emptiness of the battlefield demands independently thinking and acting fighters who exploit each situation in a considered, determined and bold way. They must by thoroughly conscious of the fact that only results matter. Habituation to physical effort, hardness against oneself, willpower, self-confidence and courage enable a man to master the most difficult situations.

11. The quality of commander and men determines the fighting power (kampfkraft) of a unit which must be properly backed up by high quality supply and maintenance. High fighting power can cancel out numerical inferiority. The higher this quality, the stronger and the more mobile the conduct of war. Superior leadership and superior troops are secure bases for victory.

15. From the youngest soldier upwards, the independent commitment of all spiritual, intellectual and physical facilities is demanded. Only thus can the full power of the troops be brought to bear in action. Only thus is it possible to develop men who are brave and decisive in times of danger and who are capable of pulling others along in bold exploits.

THUS DECISIVE ACTION REMAINS THE FIRST PREREQUISITE FOR SUCCESS IN WAR. EVERYBODY, FROM THE HIGHEST COMMANDER TO THE YOUNGEST SOLDIERS, MUST BE CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT INACTIVITY AND LOST OPPORTUNITIES WEIGH HEAVIER THAN DO ERRORS IN THE CHOICE OF MEANS.(32)

37. Creveld, Fighting Power, pp. 40-42

38. Ibid., p. 190.

39. Ibid., p. 52, "Between the alternatives of either keeping existing divisions up to strength by means of replacements or using the latter in order to set up new divisions the German Army, prodded by Hitler, opted for the second. This arrangement has been much ridiculed by subsequent critics who saw in it merely an unbusiness-like obsession with numbers; and it is undeniable that, since combat troops are used up faster than staffs and services, some waste was involved in not keeping divisions up to established strengths. On the other hand, German commanders unhesitatingly used troops in functions for which they had not been intended, thus eliminating at least part of this waste. Furthermore, the large number of divisions made possible the rotation of units in and out of the line right down to the end of the war. Above all, this policy meant that German divisions, especially at the lowest levels, were and remained tight bunches of men who suffered, fought and died together.

40. Creveld, Fighting Power, p. 70.

41. Ibid., pp. 137-138. In July 1944, the number of NCO schools had risen to 21. The training personnel, mostly wounded officers and NCOs who had served with great distinction, numbered 5,250. The number of trainees in all schools was 13,400.

42. Ibid., p. 151. Willpower and the inclination towards an outdoor life; technical competence and a warlike nature; the capacity to represent and the ability to lead; these, and not cerebral excellence per se, were presumed to be the prime qualities needed in an officer. P.155

43. Ibid., pp. 2, 146. It is worth mentioning that the road from noncommissioned to commissioned rank was an open one in World War II, traversed by tens of thousands of men. The bond between officers and men was emphasized more

strongly still by the use of a comprehensive term, "soldiers", to describe them both, and by the Regulations which required the men to salute not merely their officers, but each other too. Having spent much of their training period in the company of enlisted men, officers were freely permitted to fraternize with them off duty and even encouraged to do so by the tenets of National Socialism. Possibly as a result of all this, in interviews with prisoners of war, "nearly all NCO's and officers of the company grade level were regarded by the German soldier throughout the Western campaign as brave, efficient and considerate.

44. Ibid., pp. 4, 45-46.

45. Ibid., p. 150. [The above as opposed to] 70-80 percent of all American enlisted men questioned during the war thought chat officers put their own welfare above that of their troops. pp. 82-89, 153-156.

46. U.S. Army, Field Manual 22-10, Leadership, Washington D.C., March 1951, p.3.

47. Creveld, Fighting Power, pp. 191-194.

48. Ibid., pp. 187-188.

49. U.S. Army, FM 100-5, p. 5.

50. Huston, The Sinews of War, World War I figures p. 312. See Also The Army and Economic Mobilization, p.122, table 16. World War II figures

51. Creveld, Fighting Power, pp. 74, 137-138, 153-156, 177.

52. U.S. Army, The United States Army Posture Statement FY 90/91, Addendum, dated 4 May, 1989, p. 3. This is a rough comparison of Army personnel inducted as a percentage of national populations of the United States and Germany for the years 1989 and 1943 respectively. This does not consider that women were not inducted into the Wehrmacht during World War II, and they would add a considerable number to the population available for induction in the United States in 1989.

53. U.S. Army, FM 100-5, p.5. See also Creveld, Fighting Power, pp. 188-190.

54. U.S. Army, FM 22-100, pp. 156-158.

55. Creveld, Fighting Power, pp. 89-93.

56. Ibid., p. 189.

57. U.S. Army, FM 22-100, p. 4.

58. Ibid., p. 120.

59. U.S. Army, FM 22-100, p. 157. See also Creveld, Fighting Power, pp. 89-93, 104. This problem has been the focus of numerous U. S. Army initiatives, such as, COHORT, homebasing, and regimental affiliation. It is obviously considered an area of significant concern by the Army senior leadership.

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